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Banking supervisors and regulators attach too much importance to the current 
capital ratios, despite the multi-indicators approach encouraged by Basel III. The 
recent experience of Dexia shows that reliance on this single capital indicator can be 
very costly. A month before the announcement of the €94 billion rescue package on 
October 10th,1 the Belgian-French bank stressed that it still had a solid capital 
reserve.2 The bank quoted regulatory capital ratios at the end of June that were well 
above the legal standards. Why then did this seemingly sound bank fail? And why 
did the EBA stress tests, whose results were published only in July, fail to signal 
Dexia’s problems? 
hen first published, the results of the stress tests performed by the European 
Banking Authority (EBA) gave little evidence of Dexia’s vulnerability. The test was 
based on the current criteria for Basel II capital (core Tier-1 ratio). Dexia was 
ranked 12th of the 90 tested banks, with a stressed core Tier-1 ratio of more than twice the 
benchmark of 5%. In turn, the equity ratio was only about 1.9%, representing one-sixth of the 
core Tier-1 ratio at year-end 2010. In other words, for every €53 in assets, the bank had only 
€1 in capital (see Table 1). Such a level of leverage is high, twice in fact the average of large 
EU banks.3 The leverage and difference with other large banks are largely explained by the 
calculation of the risk-weighted assets (RWA) and the definition of core Tier-1 capital, both 
of which painted an overly optimistic picture.  
 
                                                      
1 In short, the rescue package agreed by Belgium, France and Luxembourg foresees a split of Dexia in which the 
Belgium state will acquire Dexia Bank Belgium (excluding Dexia Asset Management) for €4 billion plus profit-
sharing when the bank is sold within five years. In addition, Belgium (60.5%), France (36.5%) and Luxembourg 
(3%) will provide up to €90 billion in guarantees to Dexia. Furthermore, the bank will enter into negotiations for 
the sale of Dexia Banque Internationale à Luxembourg to the Luxembourg state and to guarantee the funding of 
local French municipalities with Caisse des Dépôts et Consignations (CDC) and La Banque Postale. 
2 For Dexia’s response to a series of ‘negative’ news reports, see 
http://www.dexia.com/EN/news/in_short/Pages/Liquidity-funding-programme-Reaction-of-Dexia.aspx 
3 The comparative data in this commentary were drawn from R. Ayadi, E. Arbak, W.P. de Groen (2011), Business 
Models in European Banking: A pre-and post-crisis screening, CEPS Paperback, September 
 (www.ceps.eu/book/business-models-european-banking-pre-and-post-crisis-screening). 
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Table 1. Development of capital ratios (2006-10) 
    2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
RWA as % of total assets  23.5% 26.4% 23.5% 24.8% 24.9% 
Total equity as % of total assets  3.3%  2.7%  0.9%  2.1%  1.9% 
Core Tier 1 ratio (min 4%)  8.7%  8.2%  9.6%  11.3%  12.1% 
Capital adequacy ratio (min 8%)  10.3%  9.6%  11.8%  14.1%  14.7% 
Leverage ratio (assets/equity)  30.7  36.9  115.9  48.2  52.8 
Source: Author’s own calculations based on data in Tables A1-A3 in the Annex. 
Dexia’s regulatory capital was much higher than its total equity due to over €10 billion of 
losses that were not recognised in the income statement.4 This balance sheet item mainly 
consists of reclassifications. Assets held in a bank’s trading book may prompt losses during 
downturns owing to the fact that they are valued according to the fair value of those 
securities. This can give banks an incentive to transfer assets to their banking books in order 
to avoid incurring further losses in the future. According to an amendment made by the 
International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) to IAS 39 on Financial Instruments: 
Recognition and Measurement in October 2008,5 these transfers can be made when these 
‘unrealised’ losses (i.e. the difference between the market value and the fair value) are 
deducted from the company’s total equity—but not core Tier-1 capital. Dexia made extensive 
use of these transfers, which made the bank’s core Tier-1 ratio appear nearly twice as high, 
which is very uncommon.6  
Over the past five years, Dexia’s RWA accounted for roughly one-quarter of its total assets 
(see Table A3 in the Annex).7 This share is significantly lower than for most other large banks 
in Europe, whose average ratio of RWA-to-assets is nearly 40%. Under current capital 
regulations, banks do not have to hold any capital charges for most public debt, even if the 
assets are potentially at-risk, as in the case of exposures to Greece. In Dexia’s case, exposures 
to public authorities represented over one-half of the bank’s total activities, of which over 
80% had a negligible risk weight of 10% or less.  
The large sovereign holdings made the bank very vulnerable to the eurozone sovereign debt 
crisis. Dexia’s credit risk exposure to Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain (GIIPS) was 
€100 billion, €22 billion of which was in government bonds.8 The scenario in the EBA’s stress 
test, however, factored in very limited losses on outstanding loans to the public sector. In the 
test, significant depreciation charges were taken only in the trading book for loans to the 
public sectors in Greece, Ireland and Portugal, whereas Dexia’s trading book holds only a 
fraction of its total exposure to public sector lending in these countries. Depreciations on 
loans in the bank book were limited, but they form the bulk of Dexia’s exposure. At worst, 
the charges were even still below the 21% write-down by the Institute for International 
Finance (IIF) on Greek sovereign debt, announced a week after the EBA disclosed the stress 
test results. In retrospect, the EBA was too conservative in its assumptions for the stress 
                                                      
4 See also Table A1 in the Annex for the construction and development of Dexia’s equity. 
5 See http://www.iasb.org/NR/rdonlyres/BE8B72FB-B7B8-49D9-95A3-
CE2BDCFB915F/0/AmdmentsIAS39andIFRS7.pdf. 
6 This decrease is substantially larger than the average of between 5% to 10% deduction of core tier for most other 
major EU banks. See also Table A2 in the Annex for the calculation and development of Dexia’s core tier 1 capital. 
7 Among the various possible explanations for these differences, Dexia’s exposure to public debt is the most 
likely. These loans, which account for about 55% of Dexia’s total credit risk exposure, traditionally have no or 
only very limited risk weight in the RWA.  
8 See Table A4 in the Annex for a distribution of the government bond holdings by country.  A CLOSER LOOK AT DEXIA: THE CASE OF THE MISLEADING CAPITAL RATIOS | 3 
 
scenario, as had also been its predecessor, the Committee of European Banking Supervisors 
(CEBS) the year before.9  
The limited absorptive capacity and substantial exposures to the GIIPS made the bank also 
prone to liquidity shortages. In fact, only one-tenth of Dexia’s (medium) long-term wholesale 
funding issued last year was uncovered.10 However, short-term funding was more important 
for the bank. The long-term loans to the public sector were to a large extent financed by 
short-term funds. As a result of the outbreak of the crisis and the uncertainty in the capital 
markets, this tiny margin business was no longer viable. Dexia became highly dependent on 
central bank funds and government guaranteed debt. This reliance on short-term liquidity 
was reduced in recent years, but was still substantial by year-end 2010.11 Attracting short-
term funding became more and more difficult during the current eurozone sovereign debt 
crisis, due to increasing haircuts on assets pledged as collateral and the closing of the short-
term government guarantee facility. The EBA’s stress test did not consider liquidity in its 
analyses.12 If the stress test had used the new indicators as suggested by Basel III (leverage-, 
liquidity-ratio, as well as stronger capital-criteria), it is more likely that Dexia would have 
been identified as a weak institution, given its high leverage and its dependence on short-
term funding. 
To conclude, the case of Dexia clearly shows that a high core Tier-1 ratio does not 
automatically imply that the bank is safer. Today’s RWA calculation is not perfect, with low-
risk weights for loans to public services. Similarly, (core) Tier-1 capital depends to a large 
extent on its definition. These sensitivities should be sufficient to treat the core Tier-1 ratio 
carefully. If the EBA stress test had anticipated the introduction of the new Basel III criteria, 
it would be more likely that it would have exposed Dexia’s vulnerabilities, enabling a better 
resolution of the bank at a minimal social cost.  
 
  
                                                      
9 The first EBA stress test has clearly provided more guidance on the exposures of the tested banks, than did the 
CEBS stress test in 2010. In the methodology note, however, EBA mentions that there are problems with the 
harmonisation of the data. Dexia’s sovereign data, for instance, do not include its loans to local public sector, in 
contrast to many other banks included in the test. The local public sector loans of Dexia have been classified as 
‘institutions’ instead.  
10 The remaining 90% consisted almost entirely of government-guaranteed debt (52%) and covered bonds (31%). 
11 It is impossible for outsiders to make comparisons with other banks due to limited transparency. However, the 
scant information available showed that Dexia was, for example, one of the biggest users of the emergency loans 
from the FED after the collapse of Lehman Brothers in September 2008.  
12 See Karel Lannoo (2011), “The second EU bank stress test: Further work in progress”, CEPS Commentary, 
CEPS, 22 July (www.ceps.eu/book/second-eu-bank-stress-test-further-work-progress). 4 | WILLEM PIETER DE GROEN 
 
 
Annex 
Table A1. Equity construction (2006-10) 
€ millions   2006  2007 2008 2009 2010 
Core shareholders' equity  14,433  16,112  17,488  18,498  19,214 
Gains and losses not recognised in the 
statement of income 
1,866 (1,587)  (13,572)  (8,317)  (10,269) 
Non controlling interest and 
Discretionary participations 
2,136 1,869 1,702 1,807 1,783 
Total  Equity  18,435 16,394 5,618  11,987 10,728 
Equity as % of total assets  3.3%  2.7%  0.9%  2.1%  1.9% 
Source: Dexia Annual Reports, 2006-2010. 
 
Table A2. (Core) Tier-1 ratios (2006-10) 
€ millions  2006  2007 2008 2009 2010 
Core shareholders' equity  14,433  16,112  17,488  18,498  19,214 
Minority  interests  501 517 557 613 660 
Intangibles, prudential filters, cumulative 
translation adjustments and other 
deductions 
(3,329) (3,503) (3,340) (2,959) (2,872) 
Core  Tier-1  capital  11,605 13,126 14,705 16,152 17,002 
Core Tier-1 ratio (min 4%)  8.7%  8.2%  9.6%  11.3%  12.1% 
Hybrid  capital  1,423 1,423 1,421 1,421 1,423 
Tier-1  Capital  13,028 14,549 16,126 17,573 18,425 
Tier-1  ratio  9.8% 9.1% 10.6%  12.3%  13.1% 
Additional  own  funds  726 796 1,951  2678  2211 
Capital adequacy capital  13,754  15,345  18,077  20,251  20,636 
Capital adequacy capital ratio (min 8%)  10.3%  9.6%  11.8%  14.1%  14.7% 
Source: Dexia Annual Reports, 2006-2010. 
 
Table A3. Size of development assets and risk-weighted assets (2006-10) 
€ millions  2006  2007 2008 2009 2010 
Total  assets  566,743 604,564 651,006 577,630 566,735 
Risk-weighted assets 
(RWA) 
133,369 159,383 152,837 143,170 140,834 
RWA as % of total assets  24%  26%  23%  25%  25% 
Source: Dexia Annual Reports, 2006-2010. A CLOSER LOOK AT DEXIA: THE CASE OF THE MISLEADING CAPITAL RATIOS | 5 
 
Table A4. Government bond portfolio GIIPS (end-2010) 
€ millions  Banking book  Trading book  Insurance book  Total 
Greece 3,437  1  828  4,266 
Ireland -  -  326  326 
Italy 12,354  5  1,143  13,502 
Portugal 1,927  -  235 2,162 
Spain 1,373  15  314  1,702 
Total 19,091  21  2,846  21,958 
Source: Dexia Annual Reports, 2006-2010. 
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